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Abstract An economic environment is a feedback system, where the dynamics
of aggregate variables depend on individual expectations and vice versa. The
type of feedback mechanism is crucial for the aggregate outcome. Experiments
with human subjects (Heemeijer et al., J Econ Dyn Control 33:1052–1072,
2009) have shown that price converges to the fundamental level in a negative
feedback environment but fails to do so under positive feedback. We present
an explanation of these experimental results by means of a model of evolution-
ary switching between heuristics. Active heuristics are chosen endogenously,
on the basis of their past performance. Under negative feedback an adaptive
heuristic dominates explaining fast price convergence, whereas under positive
feedback a trend-following heuristic dominates resulting in persistent price
deviations and oscillations.
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1 Introduction
Expectations play a major role in both financial and commodity markets
affecting individual decisions and having a large impact on aggregate vari-
ables, such as prices. Sometimes the influence of expectations seems larger
than that of other, more tangible fundamental factors. Recent literature on
Heterogeneous Agent Models shows that when non-fundamental expectations
are widespread among market participants they can result in price bubbles,
see, e.g., the review in Hommes (2006). Dynamics of heterogeneous, non-
fundamental expectations might explain different “stylized facts” of financial
markets, above all excess volatility of asset prices (Shiller 1981). For this
reason it is important to investigate how individuals form expectations about
market variables and what is their aggregate effect. The expectations of the
participants in real markets are not easily observable and are also affected
by different uncontrolled factors. This makes experiments in a controlled
environment particularly attractive for studying expectations (Duffy 2006).
The number of experiments on expectations is growing, see, e.g., Hey (1994),
Hommes et al. (2005, 2007, 2008), Adam (2007) and Fehr and Tyran (2008),
see Hommes (2011) for a recent survey. By and large these experiments reject
the dominating in economic theory Rational Expectations hypothesis. The
development of an alternative theory of expectation formation thus becomes
an important task.
In this paper we contribute to this task by fitting the Heuristics Switching
Model (HSM), introduced in Anufriev and Hommes (2009, 2012), to a recent
experiment on expectation formation presented in Heemeijer et al. (2009)
(HHST, henceforth). This experiment is one of several “learning to forecast”
experiments that have been performed in the CREED laboratory of the
University of Amsterdam (UvA). Participants of these experiments have a
single task to predict next period’s realization of an aggregate variable (price),
which depends on the average of all individual predictions. The details of
the pricing equation may change in these experiments, see the examples in
Hommes et al. (2005, 2007, 2008) and Sonnemans and Tuinstra (2010). These
early experiments have already pointed out that the type of feedback between
expectations and realization is important. In the “hog cycle” model of a
market for an agricultural good with a production lag, when the expectations
about next period’s price are high, producers produce a large amount of
the good and the realized price is low. This is an example of a negative
feedback system. The opposite situation holds in positive feedback systems.
For example, if expectations about the future price of a speculative asset are
high, the demand for the asset will increase and the realized price will be also
high. Experiments in Heemeijer et al. (2009) focus on the role of the feedback
type. In a perfectly symmetric setting, where the only difference between two
treatments is the sign of the average forecast in the pricing equation, two
different qualitative patterns have been observed. In the negative feedback
treatments, where higher expectations lead to lower price, the realized market
price converges to the fundamental level very quickly and remains there for the
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rest of the experiment. In contrast, in a positive feedback market, where higher
expectations lead to higher price realizations, the price exhibits fluctuations
and long lasting deviations from the fundamental level. The purpose of this
paper is to demonstrate that a single model of individual expectations can
explain these different aggregate outcomes.
Estimation of individual forecasts in HHST reveals that participants of the
experiment tended to use simple behavioral rules in their forecasting activity.
These rules strongly depended on the feedback type. This paper takes these
results as a starting point to fit the data with a heuristic switching model
(HSM) which also explains why different rules are chosen under different
feedback. This HSM proposed in Anufriev and Hommes (2012) extends the
adaptive belief framework of Brock and Hommes (1997). In the HSM agents’
expectations are governed by several behavioral heuristics, e.g., adaptive or
trend-following rules. Agents switch between heuristics learning to use those
heuristics which performed better in the past. The impact of different heuristics
on the aggregate price is, therefore, changing over time, explaining different
aggregate outcome observed in the experiment. For the negative feedback
experiment we find that in the initial periods the adaptive heuristic performs
much better than the others. As this heuristic attracts enough participants,
the price dynamics exhibit convergence to the fundamental level with small
oscillations around it due to small noise. Along this converging time path
the adaptive heuristic performs slightly better than the others, supporting
this outcome in the long run. In the positive feedback environment the
performance of the trend-following heuristic is better. When this heuristic is
used by a majority of participants, the price deviates from the fundamental
value leading to persistent price trends, and confirming the dominating trend-
following heuristic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out the
background on which this work rests, discuss bounded rationality and recall
the HHST experiment. Section 3 presents models with a single heuristic and
HSM with several heuristics replicating the experimental data. In Section 4 we
compare the performances of different models, optimize the best performing
model and discuss the robustness of the model simulations. Finally, Section 5
presents the conclusions drawn from our research.
2 Agents’ rationality and market feedback
One of the main theoretical and methodological foundations of this paper
is the concept of bounded rationality initially proposed by Herbert Simon,
see, e.g., Simon (1957). According to Sargent (1993) bounded rationality
provides an alternative to the stringent restrictions enforced by the concept
of rational expectations (RE). Full rationality imposes two requirements on
economic models. The first is that individuals act rationally, maximizing some
objective function subject to perceived constraints. The second requirement
is that there is consistency of perceptions about these constraints among
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different individuals, which is guaranteed by REs. REs require agents to
have profound knowledge about their surroundings, such as knowledge of
the precise equations of the environment and expectations of other agents.
This suggests that REs only have limited and mostly theoretical appeal. We
may expect from the outset that RE models will perform poorly descriptively,
because the assumptions required by the concept are unlikely to be satisfied in
most economic environments.
In contrast, bounded rationality does not assume that economic agents be-
have as all-foreseeing beings who know the complicated structure of the whole
economy. Instead it creates a system in which agents try to maximize their
outcome by altering their forecasts to eliminate systematic forecast errors.
For instance, the adaptive learning approach advocated by Sargent (1993)
and extensively used in macroeconomics (e.g., Evans and Honkapohja 2001)
assumes that agents form expectations by means of some underlying economic
model whose parameters are unknown. Agents behave like econometricians
and estimate these parameters. By explicitly modeling a learning process,
models of bounded rationality can be used to describe non-equilibrium dy-
namics and, hence, are more useful in explaining experimental data. At the
same time, experiments can be used to discriminate between plausible learning
models. By abstracting from irrelevant details of individual learning processes,
a good model should, in particular, explain why aggregate variables, such as
price, converge to the RE trajectory in some laboratory experiments, but fail
to do so in others. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the type of the
environment’s feedback can be crucial for the outcome.
2.1 Feedback mechanisms
In economic, biological and physical systems the type of feedback between
output and inputs is important. A positive feedback system reinforces a change
in input by responding to a perturbation in the same direction. In contrast,
a negative feedback system reverses a change in input and responds to a
perturbation in the opposite direction. Davidovits (2008) points out that the
negative feedback inherent to most biological systems allows the system to
keep its response to disturbances at a relatively constant level. Examples
include the mechanism regulating body temperature by sweating or shivering
and mechanism regulating the level of blood glucose whose failure would result
in diabetes. Thus, a negative feedback stabilizes the system, as it forces it to
return to an equilibrium state after a disequilibrium shock. This principle can
be illustrated by a classical example of negative feedback in a physical system,
the centrifugal governor. In Self ish Gene Dawkins (1976) explains
The Watt governor consists of a pair of balls which are whirled round by
a steam engine. Each ball is on the end of a hinged arm. The faster the
balls fly round, the more does centrifugal force push the arms towards
a horizontal position, this tendency being resisted by gravity. The arms
are connected to the steam valve feeding the engine, in such a way that
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the steam tends to be shut off when the arms approach the horizontal
position. So, if the engine goes too fast, some of its steam will be shut off,
and it will tend to slow down. If it slows down too much, more steam will
automatically be fed to it by the valve, and it will speed up again.
On the other hand, in physics and economics many systems have positive
feedback which may trigger and reinforce instability. The chain of nuclear
fission reactions is caused by a single neutron bombarding a nucleus of
Uranium 235. As a result of collision, the Uranium 235 nucleus splits into
smaller parts, liberates energy and emits new neutrons. These neutrons hit
other Uranium 235 nuclei and so on.
In economic markets in general both types of feedback will play a role. On
the whole however, negative feedback is usually associated with supply driven
commodity markets and positive feedback with demand driven speculative
asset markets. In commodity markets, if producers expect an increase in future
prices of a certain commodity, they will start producing more of it. According
to the law of supply and demand this will then lead to a decrease in price. In
a speculative asset market, if all traders expect a stock’s value to increase they
will start buying the stock. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy by causing
the stock to increase in value. Some economists argue that financial markets
can easily lead to a state of speculative bubbles, along which the growth of
the asset prices is mainly driven by investors’ optimistic expectations, “animal
spirit”, rather than by some fundamental factors of economy, see, e.g., Akerlof
and Shiller (2009) and Kirman (2011).
The distinction between positive expectations feedback and negative expec-
tations feedback is related to the idea of strategic complements and substitutes
(Haltiwanger and Waldman 1989). If the majority of agents predict a higher
price level in the market with positive feedback, every other agent is better
off adjusting his/her own prediction upwards as well. Thus every agent has
an incentive to behave similarly to others. Such behavior is typical for an
environment with strategic substitutability. On the other hand, in a market
with negative feedback, every agent has an incentive to considerably deviate
from the majority, decreasing his/her prediction in response to an increase of
the prediction from the majority. This is a characteristic of environment with
strategic complementarity.
2.2 Experimental evidence
A number of experiments focusing on the type of feedback have recently been
performed, see, e.g., Fehr and Tyran (2008) and Sutan and Willinger (2009).
This paper builds upon the learning to forecast experiment of Heemeijer et al.
(2009), HHST, henceforth.1 The experiment is designed in such a way that the
1The data of all the learning to forecast experiments, including the experiments we dis-
cuss in this paper, are freely available at the personal web page of Cars Hommes,
http://www1.fee.uva.nl/cendef.
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only difference between two treatments is whether the feedback is positive or






where pet is the average price forecast of all the participants. The functional
form of f is linear but its slope depends on the type of market. In the negative
feedback market the (unknown) price generating law of motion is given by




+ εt , (1)
while in the positive feedback market the law of motion is given by




+ εt , (2)
where εt ∼ N(0, 1/4) is a random sequence, the same in all experimental
sessions. For both price-generating processes the rational expectations equilib-
rium, which require pet = pt, lead to the same RE outcome, pt = 60 + εt. Thus
under both negative and positive feedback the same equilibrium strategy pre-
vails, when all participants predict 60. Further, both processes have the same
absolute slope coefficient of 20/21 with respect to the average forecast. The
only difference between the two processes is the sign of the slope coefficient.2
Thirteen experimental sessions have been performed in the CREED labo-
ratory at the University of Amsterdam, six in the negative feedback treatment
with the price given by Eq. 1, and seven in the positive feedback treatment
with the price given by Eq. 2. In each session 6 participants had to predict the
price during 50 periods (with t = 0, . . . , 49). Let pei,t denote the forecast for the
price pt submitted by participant i at the beginning of period t. The average





Participants were paid according to accumulated rewards, with the reward per
period computed (in euros) as










Therefore, the accuracy of their prediction was the only concern of partici-
pants. Participants were not informed explicitly about the price generating
process. Before the experiment, they were given qualitative information on
how the market functions. They knew that the price depends on the aggregate
price prediction of a number of players and they knew the type of feedback,
2Bao et al. (2010) ran similar learning to forecast experiment with a time varying fundamental
price subject to large unanticipated shocks.




















(b) 7 groups with positive feedback.
Fig. 1 Price dynamics in the HHST experiment. a The price quickly converges to the equilibrium
level 60 under negative feedback in all 6 experimental groups. b The price never converges to the
equilibrium level 60 under positive feedback and exhibits strong oscillations over 50 periods of the
experiment in 4 of the 7 groups
positive or negative. They did not know the identity and the number of other
participants. Moreover, participants had no information about forecasts of
others. In each period, after the individual predictions were submitted, the
aggregate price has been computed from market clearing and shown to the
participants, graphically and in table form, together with their own last and
previous forecasts and rewards.
Experimental outcome: aggregate price dynamics. Figure 1 shows the market
price observed in the positive and negative feedback experimental markets.
The price in the negative feedback treatments fluctuates heavily in the first 5
periods and then quickly converges towards the value 60 to which we refer as
“the equilibrium price”. The price in the positive feedback treatments does
not converge to the equilibrium value and in several groups exhibits slow
oscillatory movement with relatively high amplitude.3
Another interesting characteristic of the experimental outcomes is that the
price development seems to depend on the price in the first period. In the
experiment this initial price p0 is a result of more or less random guesses made
by the participants. Indeed, at time 0 participants do not have any knowledge
of past prices. They are only given the range [0, 100] where the initial forecast
has to lie. Apparently, the initial price realization had a big influence on the
rest of the dynamics. In the negative feedback market shown in Fig. 1a, prices
3Ignoring the first 5 periods, the standard deviation of the price in 6 groups with negative feedback
were 0.63, 0.93, 2.97, 0.57, 1.55 and 0.84. In all these cases the interval of oscillations contained the
price 60. Ignoring the first 20 periods, the standard deviation of the price in 7 groups with positive
feedback was 3.35, 0.89, 0.82, 7.01, 2.63, 5.96 and 0.80. In all three groups where the standard
deviation was less than 1, the equilibrium price 60 did not belong to the interval of oscillations.
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fluctuated more strongly in the beginning, when the initial price significantly
differed from the equilibrium level. In the positive feedback market a more
striking difference could be observed, see Fig. 1b. In all three groups where
the standard deviation in the last 30 periods was less than 1, the initial price
was in the range of 20 from the equilibrium level. On the other hand, in both
groups where the initial price differed from the equilibrium level by a value
larger than 20, strong oscillations were observed during the experiment.
Experimental outcome: individual predictions. HHST investigated the predic-
tion behavior of individuals by estimating parameters c, ol and sl of a linear
heuristic







where pt is the price at time t and pei,t is the expectations of individual i for
the price pt. They found that such a simple, linear rule can be fitted to 71 out
of 78 participants (without autocorrelations in the residuals). Furthermore, the
forecasts given by 40 of the 78 participants can be described by an even simpler
heuristic in the form of
pei,t = α1 pt−1 + α2 pei,t−1 + (1 − α1 − α2)60 + γ (pt−1 − pt−2) . (5)
This first-order heuristic depends only on the last observed price, the last
own forecast and the last price change. A key difference between the two
treatments has been found in the estimation of the trend parameter, γ . In the
sessions with negative feedback, γ was usually non-significant, while in the ses-
sions with positive feedback, γ was, in most cases, significantly positive.4 The
use of simple forecasting rule is consistent with the finding of the behavioral
literature that agents often replace optimizing rules with relatively simple rules
of thumb, see, e.g., Conlisk (1996).
2.3 Evolutionary model of heuristics
Which model of expectations would fit the results of the HHST experiment?
As discussed above, the RE model implies that individuals immediately predict
the equilibrium price 60. The results of the experiment show strong and
persistent deviations from the equilibrium especially in the positive feedback
treatment. This suggests that the more flexible concept of bounded ratio-
nality can be more relevant. Marcet and Sargent (1989) introduced adaptive
4 The value of γ was significantly different from 0 in 3 out of 19 first-order heuristics (Eq. 5)
estimated for the participants in the negative feedback experiments and in 15 out of 21 first-order
heuristics estimated for the participants in the positive feedback experiments. In the former case
values of γ were estimated as −0.44, −0.38 and 0.06. In the latter case values of γ in the range
from 0.28 to 0.97 were observed.
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learning models, where agents behave as econometricians, applying some
linear model for price prediction and re-estimating the coefficients of the
model as more and more data are available. The models of adaptive learning
generate convergence, although with different speed, to the equilibrium price
for both feedback dynamics, Eqs. 1 and 2, considered in the HHST experiment
(Evans and Honkapohja 2001). This outcome, however, is at odds with the
experimental evidence. In fact, it is not very surprising that RE or adaptive
learning dynamics do not fit experiments well. Both approaches require a
relatively high amount of knowledge from the participants about the envi-
ronment where they operate: under REs agents have a full knowledge of the
equations governing the system, while under adaptive learning agents know
the functional form of these equations.
The “learning to forecast” experiments are made in such a way that partici-
pants have limited knowledge about the environment. Every time period of the
experiment can be though of as a one-shot game in which every participant has
many strategies (every positive number up to two decimals), and the payoffs
are given by Eq. 4. In this interpretation of the experiment, participants are
not explained that they are playing a game against each other and do not know
the exact payoff structure, since the equation for realized price is outside of
their information set. Such an experimental setting is attractive, because it
corresponds to many real world situations in which individuals make decisions
without detailed information and understanding of the underlying (complex)
environmental structure. The behavior of agents in such situation is nicely
described by Mailath (1998), pp. 1349–1350:
The typical agent is not like Gary Kasparov, the world champion chess
player who knows the rules of chess, but also knows that he doesn’t
know the winning strategy. In most situations, people do not know
they are playing a game. Rather, people have some (perhaps imprecise)
notion of the environment they are in, their possible opponents, the
actions they and their opponents have available, and the possible payoff
implications of different actions. These people use heuristics and rules
of thumb (generated from experience) to guide behavior; sometimes
these heuristics work well and sometimes they don’t. These heuristics can
generate behavior that is inconsistent with straightforward maximization.
To explain the experimental results we use the model of Anufriev and
Hommes (2012) where predictions are made by simple behavioral rules,
heuristics, as suggested by the above quote. To explain the behavior of agents
in both positive and negative feedback experiments, the forecasting heuristics
are combined in a so-called switching model, which is an extension of Brock
and Hommes (1997). More than one forecasting heuristic is tried by agents and
when a heuristic performs well it attracts more followers. Thus, the relative
weights attached to different heuristics are time-varying.
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3 Model and simulations
In this section we, first, present two different forecasting heuristics and study
the dynamics of the corresponding models with homogeneous expectations.
Then, we combine the heuristics in the switching model.
We evaluate the explanatory power of different models in two ways. In
this section we apply a first test. We compare a 50−periods ahead model
simulation (so-called simulated path) with the experimental outcomes. The
price dynamics, generated by a model, must have some of the characteristics of
the price developments observed in the experiments. In the negative feedback
market the price must fluctuate heavily in the first few periods and then
converge quickly to the equilibrium value, see Fig. 1a. In the positive feedback
market the price must oscillate slowly and either gradually converge towards
the constant level or not converge at all, see Fig. 1b. After identifying a model
that satisfies these requirements for the simulated path of 50 periods, we
apply a second test in Section 4. There the model performance in one-period-
ahead forecasting is investigated numerically, the models are optimized over
parameters and tested for robustness.
3.1 First-order heuristics
Before defining the switching model a small number of forecasting heuristics
has to be chosen. A prediction heuristic must fulfill a certain number of condi-
tions to be relevant. It should be informationally accessible to the experiment’s
participants, and it should be simple and intuitive for them to use. We define
the following two heuristics. The first heuristic is an adaptive heuristic given by
pet+1 = wpt + (1 − w)pet , (6)
where an agent’s expectation of the price in the next period, pet+1, depends
on the price of today and agents’ expectation about the price of today, with
weights w and (1 − w), respectively.
The second prediction heuristic is a trend heuristic of the form
pet+1 = pt + γ (pt − pt−1), (7)
where the expectation for the price in the next period depends on the last
price plus γ times the last price change. This heuristic is interpreted as people
expecting a constant trend in price developments.
3.2 Dynamics generated by single heuristics
What kind of aggregate behavior does each of these heuristics imply for the
negative and positive feedback environments? Figure 2 shows the determinis-
tic simulated paths with the adaptive and trend heuristics, i.e., 50-periods ahead
simulations by the model with homogeneous expectations. The first forecasts
generated by the heuristics are set to 50 in this simulation.

























(a) Expectations are formed by adaptive heuristic (6) with two different weights.



























Fig. 2 50 periods ahead forecast obtained by the models with homogeneous expectations in the
negative (left panels) and positive (right panels) feedback environments
The adaptive heuristic (Eq. 6) with w = 0.75 generates oscillatory con-
verging price dynamics in the negative and monotonically converging price
dynamics in the positive feedback markets, see Fig. 2a. This outcome is
similar to the dynamics observed in the negative feedback sessions, but is
very different from the oscillations observed in the positive feedback sessions.
Notice that a decrease of the weight w in Eq. 6 leads to less oscillating and,
eventually, to monotonic convergence under negative feedback and very slow
convergence under positive feedback, as illustrated by example with w = 0.25.
Straightforward stability analysis reveals that the trend heuristic (Eq. 7) pro-
duces converging prices in the negative feedback market when −21/20 < γ <
1/40, and converging prices in the positive feedback market when −41/40 <
γ < 21/20. For γ outside of the interval, the price dynamics under corre-
sponding feedback diverge. Interestingly, all the values of γ estimated in the
positive feedback sessions of the HHST experiment fall within the interval
of convergence under positive feedback. But the dynamics with these γ ’s
would diverge under negative feedback. The dynamics of the model where
expectations are generated by the trend heuristic are illustrated in Fig. 2b.
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For γ = 1 the dynamics under negative feedback (left panel) does not con-
verge to the equilibrium but remain bounded because the forecasts in the
simulations are limited to the interval [0, 100]. When γ is changing to 0.5
the initial oscillations are less wild but eventually converge to the same 2-
cycle. The right panel of Fig. 2b shows that for γ = 1 the price oscillates on
the positive feedback market, resembling the experimental outcome. When
γ decreases the oscillations are less pronounced and convergence eventually
become monotonic, as shown for γ = 0.5.
3.3 Heuristic switching model
In the model of heterogeneous expectations, different heuristics can be used.




nh,t peh,t , (8)
where H is the number of heuristics and nh,t is the impact of heuristic h at time
t, which depends on the past performance of the heuristic.
The performance of the heuristics is measured by squared forecasting
errors, consistently with incentives given to the participants in the experiment.
The performance of heuristic h at time t is given by
Uh,t = −(pt − peh,t)2 + ηUh,t−1 , (9)
where pt is the realized price obtained by applying Eqs. 1 or 2, respectively.
The parameter 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 represents the weight that agents attribute to past
forecasting errors. The impact of heuristic h changes according to a discrete
choice model with asynchronous updating (Hommes et al. 2005; Diks and
van der Weide 2005)
nh,t+1 = δnh,t + (1 − δ)exp(βUh,t)Zt , (10)
where Zt = ∑Hh=1 exp(βUh,t) is a normalization factor.
Two parameters are important in Eq. 10. The parameter δ is inversely
related to the frequency with which every agent updates “active” forecasting
heuristic. Positive values of δ capture the tendency of people to stick to their
previously chosen rule despite the evidence that an alternative rule performs
better. Such inertia is widely reported in experiments (Kahneman 2003). In a
large population, δ is also the average percentage of agents who do not update
their heuristic in every period. The parameter β ≥ 0 determines how strongly
those agents who update their heuristic react to a difference in performance
between heuristics. If β = 0 agents will not consider the differences in the
performance of the heuristics at all; all heuristics will be given equal impacts.
If, on the contrary, the value of β is very large, agents who update their
forecasting heuristic will all switch to the best performing heuristic.
Evolutionary selection of expectations 675
In order to simulate the model, one should
– choose H different forecasting heuristics;
– fix three learning parameters, β, η and δ;
– initialize prices in order for the heuristics to yield the initial forecasts;
– initialize the impacts for all heuristics so that the initial forecasts are
combined to determine the average price forecast.
Given these initializations, the model works as follows. For every time t, first,
the forecasts peh,t of H heuristics are computed on the basis of past prices.
Second, they are combined using Eq. 8 to provide the average price forecast.
Third, the price predicted by the model at time t is computed using Eq. 1 for
the negative feedback market or Eq. 2 for the positive feedback market. This
price is denoted simply as pt. Fourth, the performance of every heuristic Uh,t is
calculated using Eq. 9 on the basis of the realized price pt. Finally, the relative
impacts of heuristic for the next period are computed using Eq. 10. The same
steps are then repeated for time t + 1, and so on.
3.4 Dynamics of the heuristics switching model
Let us apply the heuristic switching model (HSM) given by Eqs. 9 and 10 to the
experimental results of HHST. The parameters of the heuristics are chosen as
w = 0.75 for the adaptive heuristic (Eq. 6), and γ = 1 for the trend heuristic
(Eq. 7). Recall that the heuristics with these parameters describe the two
markets relatively well: the negative feedback market is well described by the
adaptive heuristic, while the positive feedback market is well described by the
trend heuristic. After some trial and error simulations, we set the parameters of
the HSM to β = 1.5, δ = 0.1 and η = 0.1. We also choose equal initial impacts
of both heuristics and p0 = 50 as the initial price.
Figure 3a and b show the outcome of the model’s simulations in, respec-
tively, the negative and positive feedback environments. In the left panels
the two types of dynamics of the simulated path are shown. The lines show
the simulation without noise in the laws of motion (1) and (2), while the
circles correspond to the simulation with the same noise realization εt as
in the experiments. The right panels show the evolution of the heuristics’
impacts for the simulated path without noise. We observe striking difference
in the dynamics between the negative and positive feedback environments.
Indeed, the price dynamics of the heuristic switching model do adhere to
the characteristics of the experimental outcomes in both treatments. In the
negative feedback market the price oscillates heavily in the first periods and
then quickly converges. In the positive feedback market the price slowly and
(when augmented by the experimental noise) persistently oscillates around the
equilibrium.
It is particularly informative to analyze the evolution of the heuristics’
impacts. When the feedback is negative, the impact of the trend heuristic
immediately falls to almost 0 and increases later on only at the stage when
the price has already converged to the equilibrium level, i.e., when the


















































(b) Positive feedback environment.
Fig. 3 Heuristic switching model with H = 2 heuristics, adaptive and trend. The parameters are
w = 0.75, γ = 1, β = 1.5, δ = 0.1 and η = 0.1. Left: simulated path of price without noise (lines)
and with experimental noise (circles). Right: evolution of the heuristics’ impacts
predictions of both heuristics are similar. When the feedback is positive, the
opposite phenomenon takes place with the trend heuristic dominating from
the beginning of the simulations. The intuition of this result is as follows. The
trend heuristic performs well during the long phases of the trends and performs
poorly during the periods with frequent fluctuations around the constant price.
At the same time, an extensive use of the trend heuristic results in the trends
under the positive feedback and in oscillations under the negative feedback,
see Fig. 2b. Thus, under the positive feedback, the success of the trend heuristic
reinforces its use, which makes the trend in prices sustainable. The adaptive
heuristic performs relatively poorly during the trend phases and loses its
impact. On the other hand, under the negative feedback, the trend heuristic
generates oscillatory dynamics on which it performs very poorly, much worse
than adaptive heuristic. Coordination on the adaptive heuristic leads to fast
convergence through initial oscillations, as shown in Fig. 2a.
The initial 10 periods of the simulations are explained now, but what hap-
pens next? In the positive feedback market agents attach a higher impact to the
trend heuristic at the trend phases and decrease their impacts when the price
development changes direction. Even when all subjects use the trend-following





























Fig. 4 Positive feedback environment. Dynamics of the heuristic switching model with H = 2
heuristics for different initial prices. Left: no noise is added to the law of motion (2). Right:
experimental noise is added to the law of motion (2)
heuristic, the trend cannot be sustained forever and, at a certain moment, the
trend will be reverted and the impact of the adaptive heuristic will grow. This
occurs in the periods 15–17 of the simulations. Afterwards the downwarding
trend reinforces the use of the trend heuristic, but since the price is already
close to the equilibrium, the relative impacts of the heuristics are similar.
Notice that the model generates such convergence to the equilibrium only in
the absence of noise, see the left panel of Fig. 3b. In the negative feedback
market, the price is stabilized at the level close to the equilibrium during the
periods 10–15. However, the steady-state dynamics with price at the equilib-
rium level is not stable in the model with switching. Indeed, when the price
stabilizes both heuristics give the same predictions and their impacts are the
same. But the trend heuristic reinforces a trend and leads to the overshooting
of the equilibrium level. As a result, dynamics converge to the 2-period cycle
with price being very close to the equilibrium level but jumping around it.5 At
the cycle, the forecast of the trend heuristic is worse than the forecast of the
adaptive heuristic, which results in their different impacts: around 80% of the
adaptive heuristic and around 20% of the trend heuristic.
The heuristic switching model is also able to reproduce the same pattern
of dependence on the initial condition, which was observed in the HHST ex-
periment. Figure 4 shows that the different aggregate outcomes (convergence
and oscillations) within the same environment of the positive feedback can
be attributed to the path-dependent property of the HSM. Depending on the
initial price level, the model produces qualitatively different outcomes during
50 periods. Both without (the left panel) and with noise (the right panel), the
price generated by the model stays closer to the fundamental level during all
simulation, when the initial price, p0, is closer to the fundamental level.
5This cycle is almost invisible at Fig. 3a. The prices are 59.74418 and 60.2559 along the cycle. The
impacts are 0.8125 and 0.1875 for the adaptive and trend heuristics, respectively.
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3.5 Discussion
The first simulations of the heuristic switching model point to a behavioral
explanation of the difference in the experimental outcomes between positive
and negative feedback markets. When people, as subjects in the experiment or
agents in the model, cannot make strategic decisions due to the absence of full
knowledge of the environment they are operating in, they rely on behavioral
rules of thumb. In the learning to forecast experiment different rules are
possible, and some of them provide better forecasts than others. The learning
of agents then takes a form of evaluating different forecasting possibilities
and switching to those which performed better in the past. Agents in the
HSM learn individually (not socially, through the interaction with others) by
applying a counterfactual analysis of alternative forecasting rules on the basis
of past data. As a result, the population of agents switch to more successful
rules and the aggregate dynamics may change its properties (e.g., the trend in
prices may revert). Then, via the re-evaluation of performances, dynamics feed
back to the distribution of the rules’ impacts. Three parameters of the model
allow to capture the behavioral characteristics such as imperfect switching
behavior and, consequently, heterogeneity (especially when β is small), inertia
in switching (when δ is close to 1), and short memory of past performances
(when η is close to 0).
While the behavioral assumptions underlying our model are known from the
behavioral literature,6 our model does not aim to provide a precise description
of the behavior of subjects in the experiment.7 Instead, the aim of the model
is to outline a mechanism explaining both negative and positive feedback
markets at the same time. Indeed, in the simulations discussed in Section 3.4
the same heuristics and values of the learning parameters have been used. Our
model is, essentially, a parsimonious version of the numerous computational
learning models based on genetic algorithms (see, e.g., Arifovic 1996 and
Hommes and Lux 2011) or its modifications such as Individual Evolutionary
Learning (see Arifovic and Ledyard 2007 and Anufriev et al. 2011).
Our model also stresses importance of heterogeneity in the explanation of
the experiments. According to the results of Section 3.2, the homogeneous
expectations model with simple first-order heuristics we considered can not
explain negative and positive feedback experimental data simultaneously. The
results of the experiments can be explained, however, by assuming that agents
6HHST and other learning to forecast experiments showed that agents use first-order heuristics for
forecasting. Indeed, the heuristics we have chosen for the simulations were used by some subjects
in the experiment. Recent learning to forecast experiments provide evidence of switching between
simple heuristics, see illustration in Anufriev and Hommes (2009). Anufriev et al. (2011) estimate
switching parameters in a multiple choice experiment.
7For example, we ignore the fact that actual impacts in the experiment could be a multiple of
1/6, proceeding instead with arbitrary values of impacts, which is valid only under a continuum
of agents. An alternative interpretation is that every agent combines two forecasts, adaptive and
trend, with time varying weights.
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learn to change their forecasting methods. The heuristic switching model
can be simulated with many heuristics. For example, the model analyzed in
Anufriev and Hommes (2012) had 4 different heuristics. We found, however,
that the two heuristics are sufficient to reproduce the result of the HHST
experiment qualitatively, and preferred such parsimonious version of the
model over other possible specifications.8
4 Validation and robustness
In this section we further examine the performance of the heuristic switching
model with the adaptive and trend forecasting heuristics. First, we investigate
the one-period-ahead forecasting performance of the HSM, compare it with
performances of the other models, and also fit the HSM to the data.9 Second,
we investigate robustness of the model with respect to the change in parameter
values.
4.1 One-period ahead model predictions
We now apply the heuristic switching model in a different way than before.
The difference is that at each period of the simulation the past experimental
prices are used to compute the heuristics’ forecasts and impacts. Every time
the heuristic switching model will produce a one-period ahead forecast of the
price. This forecast is based upon the same information as subjects had in the
experiment. Formally, it means that in Eqs. 6, 7 and 9 we substitute the price
predicted by the model, pt, by the price observed in one of the experimental
groups, pGr Xt . In particular, the impacts of the heuristics are updated now as in
Eq. 10 on the basis of the performance given by
Uh,t = −(pGr Xt − peh,t)2 + ηUh,t−1 .
After the forecasts and impacts of all heuristics are computed, the correspond-
ing price equation generates the one-period ahead prediction of the price by
the HSM.
The one-period ahead predictions of the switching model with adaptive and
trend heuristics are shown in the left panels of Fig. 5 for one of the groups from
the negative feedback treatment and for two groups from the positive feedback
treatment. In the right panels the dynamics of the impacts of the two heuristics
8We simulated the model with 3 heuristics, adding to the adaptive and trend heuristic a, so-
called, anchoring and adjustment heuristic obtained from Eq. 5 by replacing the (unknown to
the participants) fundamental price 60 by the average of all past prices. The anchoring and
adjustment heuristic combines some features of the trend and adaptive heuristics. It is, therefore,
not surprising that the dynamics of the model with 3 heuristics (not shown in the paper) is not very
different from the dynamics shown in Fig. 3.
9For other examples of fitting the similar learning models to the experimental or survey data, see
Colucci and Valori (2006) and Branch (2004).





















































(b) Positive feedback: Session 4, group 1.
(c) Positive feedback: Session 4, group 4.


























Fig. 5 Dynamics of the HHST experiment as compared with the one-period ahead predictions by
the heuristic switching model, augmented by experimental noise. The parameters are w = 0.75,
γ = 1, β = 1.5, δ = 0.1 and η = 0.1. Left: price dynamics in the experiment (points) and forecasts
generated by the model (line). Right: evolution of impacts of two heuristics
are shown. In all these simulations the parameters of the model are as before,
β = 1.5, δ = 0.1 and η = 0.1. Figure 5a shows the price behavior in the negative
feedback market. The prices predicted by the HSM take slightly longer to
converge than the price outcomes of the experiments. After an initial phase
the adaptive heuristic starts to clearly dominate the trend heuristic, explaining
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Table 1 MSEs of 5 different models over 47 time periods of the experiment
Model Negative feedback Positive feedback 12 groups
Fundamental 2.5712 46.8344 24.7028
Adaptive 2.3001 2.9992 2.6497
Trend 21.1112 0.9260 11.0186
Mixed 7.9798 1.0518 4.5158
HSM 3.2967 0.9065 2.1016
The results are averaged over all 6 experimental groups of the negative feedback treatment (2nd
column), and over 6 out of 7 experimental groups in the positive feedback treatment (3rd column),
see footnote 11. The last column displays the joint result for 12 experimental groups
the price convergence to the fundamental level. Figure 5b shows the price
dynamics in the positive feedback market with a large deviation of the initial
price from the fundamental value. The price deviates from the fundamental
value persistently, oscillates and does not show any sign of convergence.
The trend heuristic dominates during this simulation. Finally, Fig. 5c shows
a different outcome in the positive feedback market, when the initial price
is close to the fundamental value. The price dynamics now stays consistently
above but close to the fundamental value and the impacts of the two heuristics
are more or less balanced during the simulation.
4.2 Model optimization
The one-period ahead predictions by the heuristic switching model can be
compared with similar predictions obtained by the other models. As a fitness
measure we will use the mean squared error (MSE) of the model’s predictions





pGr Xt − pModt
)2
,
where pGr Xt is the realized price in group X of the experiment and p
Mod
t is
the one-period ahead prediction of the model Mod, taken all information up
to and including period t − 1 into account. When these MSEs are computed
over the data in G different groups and then averaged, the result is denoted as
MSEkG.
Table 1 shows the MSEs of five different models over the last k = 47 periods
(i.e., for t = 3, . . . , 49).10 The second column shows the MSE computed over 6
10The errors of the first three periods are not taken into account for the following reason.
Both heuristics of the HSM require two prices to be initialized (for adaptive heuristic we set
pe1 = pGr X0 ). Therefore, at time t = 2 the first performances of the heuristics are obtained when
their first predictions, peh,2, are compared with experimental price p
Gr X
2 . The performances
determine the impacts and only from period t = 3 the HSM is able to generate price prediction.
For comparison, in all other models we compute errors also from t = 3. We also have computed
similar MSEs on the data starting from periods t = 4, 5 and 6 and obtained very similar results.
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groups of the negative feedback experiment, the third column shows the MSE
computed over 6 groups of the positive feedback experiment,11 and the last
column gives the MSE over all these 12 groups. We compare the following five
models: ‘fundamental’ model, corresponding to the RE, according to which
the prediction is 60 every period; two models with homogeneous expectations,
‘adaptive’ and ‘trend’, when expectations generated by, respectively, Eqs. 6
and 7 are directly plugged into the laws of motion; heterogeneous expectations
model where these two heuristics are combined with fixed impacts equal to
50% each period; and the heuristic switching model described in Section 3.4.
The benchmark values of parameters have been used in these models, w =
0.75, γ = 1, β = 1.5, δ = 0.1 and η = 0.1. The MSEs for the best among the
five models are shown in bold.
As expected from the previous analysis, in the negative feedback environ-
ment the fundamental model works well, and the adaptive model is better
than the trend model. In contrast, in the positive feedback environment the
trend model works very well, the adaptive model is worse and the fundamental
models perform very bad. Consider now a forecasting method of averaging the
predictions of the two heuristics (line ‘mixed’ in Table 1). Performance of this
model with heterogeneous expectations but fixed, equal weights is better than
the average performance of the heuristics in a given environment. However,
in every environment and also for all 12 groups, this model still performs
considerably worse than the best of the two simple heuristics. Finally, the
heuristic switching model performs better than the other models in the positive
feedback environment and is worse than the adaptive heuristic in the negative
feedback environment. It is also the best performing among these 5 models
when the MSEs are averaged over 12 experimental groups. As opposed to
the model with constant equal weights, the HSM makes the best out of two
homogeneous heuristics.
A comparison of the models on the basis of the mean squared errors is not
completely satisfactory, since the HSM has more additional parameters. To
address this issue one can relate minimization of the MSE with maximization of
a certain likelihood function and then evaluate the fitness of the models using
the two criteria commonly used to penalize models for additional parameters,
the Akaike Information Criterion and the Bayesian Information Criterion.
See Appendix for details. According to the Akaike Information Criterion
better models should have lower value of AIC = 2n + kG ln(MSEkG) − 2C,
where k = 47 is the number of observations in one group, G is the number
of groups in the sample, n is the number of parameters of the model and C is a
constant which depends on the sample size but does not depend on the model.
11We eliminated one of the groups of the positive feedback experiment as an outlier. In this
group at time t = 7 one of the participants predicted 5250, making, presumably, a typing error
(in previous three period the predictions of this participant were 50.0, 52.0 and 51.0). As a result,
the realized price was 877.8 and was above 100 for another four periods.
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According to the Bayesian Information Criterion better models should have
lower value of BIC = n ln(kG) + kG ln(kMSEk) − 2C.
Table 2 shows the MSEs, AICs and BICs for the adaptive and trend
homogeneous models and the heuristic switching model. In each case we do
not only show the statistics for the model with the benchmark values of the
parameters but also optimize the model by searching for the parameter values
Table 2 Fit of 9 different models over 47 time periods of the experiment
Model Negative feedback Positive feedback 12 groups
Adaptive Benchmark MSE 2.3001 2.9992 2.6497
w 0.75 0.75 0.75
AIC 2070.3458 2220.0313 2150.1399
BIC 2070.3458 2220.0313 2150.1399
Optimized MSE 2.3001 1.8218 2.3680
wˆ 0.75 1.00 0.91
AIC 2072.3451 1940.8575 2088.7528
BIC 2076.6802 1945.1926 2093.0879
Trend Benchmark MSE 21.1112 0.9260 11.0186
γ 1.00 1.00 1.00
AIC 3320.6515 1557.2206 2953.9288
BIC 3320.6515 1557.2206 2953.9288
Optimized MSE 1.9237 0.7480 2.2940
γˆ −0.33 0.71 −0.16
AIC 1971.5531 1438.7973 2070.8502
BIC 1975.8881 1443.1323 2075.1852
Mixed Benchmark MSE 7.9798 1.0518 4.5158
(w, γ, n) (0.75,1.00,0.50) (0.75,1.00,0.50) (0.75,1.00,0.50)
AIC 2771.9429 1629.0202 2450.8370
BIC 2771.9429 1629.0202 2450.8370
Optimized MSE 2.3001 0.7568 2.6276
(w, γ, nˆ) (0.75,1.00,0.76) (0.75,1.00,0.38) (0.75,1.00,1.00)
AIC 2072.3458 1445.4272 2147.4263
BIC 2076.6809 1449.7623 2151.7614
HSM Benchmark MSE 3.2967 0.9065 2.1016
(β, η, δ) (1.50,0.10,0.10) (1.50,0.10,0.10) (1.50,0.10,0.10)
(w, γ ) (0.75,1.00) (0.75,1.00) (0.75,1.00)
AIC 2273.3741 1545.1924 2019.4464
BIC 2273.3741 1545.1924 2019.4464
Optimized 1 MSE 2.3001 0.7329 1.5402
(βˆ, ηˆ, δˆ) (1.44,1.00,0.00) (0.01,0.96,0.34) (0.02,0.97,0.00)
(w, γ ) (0.75,1.00) (0.75,1.00) (0.75,1.00)
AIC 2076.3458 1431.2754 1850.1692
BIC 2089.3510 1444.2806 1863.1743
Optimized 2 MSE 1.9225 0.7088 1.5051
(βˆ, ηˆ, δˆ) (1.46,1.00,0.15) (0.48,0.85,0.00) (0.37,0.87,0.00)
(wˆ, γˆ ) (0.98,−2.00) (0.83,0.75) (0.75,0.75)
AIC 1979.2104 1416.4752 1841.1650
BIC 2000.8857 1438.1504 1862.8403
The fit is performed over all 6 experimental groups of the negative feedback treatment (2nd
column), and over 6 out of 7 experimental groups in the positive feedback treatment (3rd column),
see footnote 11. The last column displays the joint fit for 12 experimental groups. The entries show
the values of three fitness criteria MSE, AIC and BIC, and the values of corresponding parameters
684 M. Anufriev et al.
which minimize the MSE.12 The corresponding parameters values are also
given. The best (i.e., smallest) statistics are shown in bold. Under the negative
feedback the optimized model with trend heuristic is better according to AIC
and BIC. Notice, however, that the maximum for the HSM model is obtained
when constrained on γ is binding by artificially chosen value of −2. More
importantly, the best model results in a negative value of γ , which is difficult
to interpret and would lead to very bad fit under the positive feedback. Under
the positive feedback according to all criteria, the best performing model is the
HSM when it is optimized both with respect to the three learning parameters,
β, η and δ and to the two parameters of the heuristics, w and γ . Finally,
when all 12 groups are taken into account, all three specifications of the HSM
outperform the other considered models according to each fitness measure.
Even if penalized for 5 parameters, the fully optimized HSM is better in one-
period ahead prediction than other considered specifications.
4.3 Robustness
Finally, we briefly discuss the issue of robustness. A model is said to be robust
if a change in parameter values does not immediately result in a change of
the model’s characteristics. A good prediction model should yield good results
even if parameters are slightly changed. If, for example, the parameter value
for β in the HSM is increased by, say, ten percent, this should not lead to a
dramatic change in price dynamics. In the experiments it is unlikely that the
agents held stringent parameters from which they do not deviate. The general
results of the model should, therefore, hold even if the parameters of the model
change slightly.
In order to test the model on robustness we compare the MSE of the best-
fitted model with the MSEs of 4 × 2 × 8 = 64 other models. Each of these al-
ternative models is obtained by changing one, two or three learning parameters
(β, η and δ) by ±10%, ±20%, ±30% or ±40% with respect to their estimated
values reported in the bottom right cell of Table 2. We do not vary the values
of two other parameters w = 0.75 and γ = 0.75. Table 3 shows the results of
this exercise obtained for the last 47 time periods in all the experimental groups
(except for one group from the positive feedback experiment, see footnote 11).
For a comparison, the last row shows the corresponding percentage increase of
the MSE of the best-fitted model. We observe that changes of parameters of
10% and 20% do not lead to a significant change in the model performance.
Even after a 40% change of the optimal values of the parameters, the resulting
models perform better than homogeneous models. We conclude, that the
heuristic switching model is fairly robust with respect to the changes of the
parameter values.
12The search is made by fmincon routine in MATLAB, and we controlled the results using the
grid search. We implemented the following constraints: w ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ [−2, 2], β ≥ 0, η ∈ [0, 1],
and δ ∈ [0, 1].
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Table 3 Robustness test of the heuristics switching model
0% +10% −10% +20% −20% +30% −30% +40% −40%
β 1.5051 1.5052 1.5052 1.5053 1.5055 1.5054 1.5061 1.5056 1.5072
η 1.5051 1.5109 1.5158 1.5156 1.5654 1.5163 1.6037 1.5166 1.6350
δ 1.5051 1.5051 1.5051 1.5051 1.5051 1.5051 1.5051 1.5051 1.5051
β, η 1.5051 1.5114 1.5188 1.5160 1.5745 1.5168 1.6190 1.5171 1.6585
β, δ 1.5051 1.5052 1.5052 1.5053 1.5055 1.5054 1.5061 1.5056 1.5072
η, δ 1.5051 1.5109 1.5158 1.5156 1.5654 1.5163 1.6037 1.5166 1.6350
β, η, δ 1.5051 1.5114 1.5188 1.5160 1.5745 1.5168 1.6190 1.5171 1.6585
MSE 1.5051 1.6556 1.8061 1.9566 2.1072
For one, two or three parameters we report the value of MSE (over 47 time periods in 12
experimental groups) of the model resulting in a given percentage change of every of these
parameters. The last row shows the corresponding percentage increase of the benchmark value
of MSE, 1.5051
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the experimental results of markets with negative and
positive feedbacks in Heemeijer et al. (2009). Estimations of individual fore-
casting rules in that paper showed that participants relied on simple first-
order forecasting heuristics, anchoring their expectations to past prices and
past predictions and extrapolating past trends. The estimated individual rules
tended to attach positive weight to the trend term in the positive feedback
treatments but did not attach weight to this term in the negative feedback
treatments. The aggregate dynamics was also very different between the two
treatments. The heuristic switching model, simulated in this paper, provides an
explanation why this difference in individual forecasting and aggregate price
behavior took place.
Several models have been compared with the aggregate price dynamics from
the experiment. None of the single heuristic models could provide qualitative
features observed in both negative and positive feedback experimental envi-
ronments. In contrast, the switching model was able to reproduce experimental
“stylized facts”. In fact, a parsimonious model where agents switch between the
adaptive and the trend heuristics does well in explaining the most important
characteristics of the price dynamics observed in the experiment. Consistently
with the experiment, in the negative feedback market the simulations showed
strong oscillations in the first periods followed by quick convergence towards
the equilibrium price. In the positive feedback market the model exhibited
persistent deviations from the equilibrium price and slow oscillations. The
price outcomes of the model were also dependent on the initial price with
more persistent oscillations when the initial state deviated more from the
fundamental price, similarly to the outcome of the experiments.
Acknowledgements We are grateful to the participants of the workshop “Evolution and market
behavior in economics and finance” in Pisa, Italy (October 2009) for fruitful discussion, and to
the three anonymous referees for useful suggestions. This work was supported by the EU 7th
framework collaborative project “Monetary, Fiscal and Structural Policies with Heterogeneous
Agents (POLHIA)”, grant no. 225408. The usual caveats apply.
686 M. Anufriev et al.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix
Likelihood method
We use likelihood technique to compare the predictive power of different
models. Recall that for the price in the experimental group X is denoted as
pGr Xt and that p
Mod
t (θ) stays for a price prediction made by a model Mod with
parameters θ . We confine ourselves to the one-step ahead predictions using
data from an experimental group. In this case the information set consists of
all prices in the experimental group X up to and included period t − 1 and the
prediction error at time t is pModt (θ) − pGr Xt . Assuming that these errors are
independent and normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2, we can
define the likelihood function

















where for each group we include the last k = 47 periods in the sample (see
footnote 10). The first product in Eq. 11 is over all the groups whose data are
used in the estimation. In Table 2 three cases are shown: when the likelihood
is computed over 6 groups with negative feedback, over 6 groups with positive
feedback, and over all 12 groups.
Consistently with the notation in Section 4.2 the mean squared error in one
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.
When we compute Eq. 11 over data from G groups, we denote the mean
squared error over all groups as MSEkG, which is a mean of squared errors
over kG data points.
Maximization of the likelihood function is equivalent to maximization of



















Denote by θˆ , σˆ the parameter values under which the log-likelihood is max-
imized. They satisfy the set of first order conditions (f.o.c.). The f.o.c. with
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respect to θ do not depend on σ and are identical to the f.o.c. for minimization
of the MSE. This justifies that the parameters of the learning model found
by minimization of the MSE will also maximize the likelihood. The f.o.c. with





















ln MSEkG(θˆ ) + C ,
(13)
where the constant C = −kG(1 + ln(2π))/2 depends on the number of obser-
vations but not on the model.
For a model with n parameters the Akaike Information Criterion is de-
fined as
AIC = 2n − 2 ln L(θˆ , σˆ 2; exp. data) ,
while the Bayesian Information Criterion is defined as
BIC = n ln(kG) − 2 ln L(θˆ , σˆ 2; exp. data) .
Plugging the log-likelihood found in Eq. 13 into the last two formulas, we find
that
AIC = 2n + kG ln MSEkG(θˆ ) − 2C , (14)
and
BIC = n ln(kG) + kG ln MSEkG(θˆ ) − 2C . (15)
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